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Slavic Review

American-SovietRelations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism.By Peter
G. Boyle. New York: Routledge, 1993. xiv, 321 pp. Index. Paper.
Peter Boyle is lecturer in American History at the University of Nottingham and the
author of numerous articles on relations between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union.
American-SovietRelations is his latest work and his first look at the entire sweep of
relations between the US and Soviet Russia. Based on a wide reading of secondary
sources and published document collections with an emphasis on the American side,
this book is an excellent survey in the tradition of John Lewis Gaddis's America,Russia,
and the Soviet Union (1978), particularly for nonspecialists.
Boyle sets out in the wake of the end of the cold war and the collapse of the
Soviet Union to answer the question "Why was the relationship between the two
superpowers so difficult?" His answer, judiciously phrased and carefully nuanced, is
essentially that both countries were obsessed with extending the range of their own
ideology and protecting their own systems. Thus, no real coexistence or compromise
was possible for any extended period until the collapse of one or the other. Boyle
does tend to side with the so-called "post-revisionists" in that he places greater blame
for the origins of the cold war on Soviet actions in the immediate postwar period. But
he has a sharp analysis of American anti-communism as well, and he argues forcefully
that domestic American politics contributed heavily to the virulence and depth of
cold-war antagonism.
The book's major weakness is its analysis of Soviet strategy and policies. Not only
does it fail to take advantage of recent studies utilizing newly opened Soviet archives,
such as the variety of excellent papers of the Cold War International History Project,
but it also contains an inadequate coverage of published documents, scholarly articles
and monographs on Soviet foreign policy and its contribution to the cold war.
Boyle's ideological emphasis sometimes blinds him to the strength of other forces
in the relationship. For example, he argues that the early years were dominated by
Lenin-Wilson hostility, downplaying the divided allies and their lack of concerted
intent in intervention on the one hand, and the burgeoning economic ties of the 1920s
on the other. Likewise in the Eisenhower era, while he does not fall into the trap of
equating Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's anti-communist rhetoric with Eisenhower's policy, he underplays the very real first efforts of detente between Ike and
Nikita Khrushchev in 1954-1955, and Ike's role in the preliminaries of the nuclear
test ban negotiations in the late 1950s.
Boyle's overreliance on the American side also weakens his otherwise important
analysis of the end of the cold war. He rightly rejects those who would give sole credit
to American military expansion and Ronald Reagan for the sea changes of the late
1980s. YeL his efforts to bring out Mikhail Gorbachev's key role are hampered by his
lack of attention to the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy and its impact on
Soviet military posture, negotiating stance and support for client states in the third
world. Boyle rightly emphasizes the role of people-to-people "citizen diplomacy" of
the Reagan era but he devotes surprisingly little attention to the European anti-nuclear
movement and its pressure on both European governments and the superpowers to
stop the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe and to rescue Ostpolitik.
Despite these weaknesses and any personal disagreements in analysis which I may
have, Boyle's synthesis is first-rate.This is the best single-volume, easily accessible
account of Soviet-American relations now in print. It should be required reading for
both undergraduates and graduate students in courses in Soviet-American relations,
US foreign relations and Russian foreign policy; as well as for policymakers and all
students of history.
Its final conclusion rings true. While, "On the whole, containment was successful,"
the US should "resist the temptation to go beyond containment and to embark upon
a quest for universal conversion to American-style democracy and free-enterprise capitalism." Rather policy makers should seek "a world safe for pluralism, with coexistence between differing political, religious, social and economic systems."
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